Reflections on the progress of the WTO over the last two decades highlights low developing country participation in its dispute settlement system as a fundamental failing of the multinational trading system. Recurrently, this low participation rate has been attributed to the cost of the WTO's legalistic model in Panel and Appellate Body proceedings, creating a concern of bias. Yet, by focussing on the inherent costs of the system, critics ignore the real ways in which developing countries can and have used the WTO dispute settlement system to offset the costs. Therefore, this article argues that developing countries are more disadvantaged in their lack of internal capacity to identify and progress legitimate violations to the WTO. Only by addressing the capacity issue can an accurate cost and benefit analysis of the WTO dispute settlement system take place.
A. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement system celebrates its 20th anniversary this year as 'the central pillar of the multilateral trading system'. 1 One of the main areas of reform with which the dispute settlement system came into existence was:
'Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.' 2 Although much has been debated of its early success and failures, the two decades since its implementation has seen the changes in patterns of trade and global growth remain largely unreflected in the use of the dispute settlement system by developing countries. Despite this, recent calls for reform of the system have been quiet and the seemingly everlasting Doha Round reveals a complacency and lack of political will at the top. This paper hopes to recapture the original debate on the position of developing countries within the dispute settlement system and, at a minimum, show that notwithstanding the current complacency of its members the dispute settlement system does have much cause to celebrate.
It is argued here that the dispute settlement system has been successful in sustaining a rule of law that has been proven to benefit developing countries. The 'legalistic' approach of members' decision-making. On the whole, countries can calculate in monetary terms the prospective gains of lifted trade barriers and therefore the prospective benefits of filing WTO proceedings. Following from this is that 'failure to participate in the WTO dispute settlement system can have term of trade effects that adversely affect the overall social welfare of the country'. 6 Although these may be harder to calculate than the specific economic outcomes, term of trade effects in relation to a country's market access and trade relationships must also be taken into consideration when weighing the cost of initiating WTO proceedings.
More importantly, often overlooked by WTO members is the effect that each dispute has on interpretation and application of WTO jurisprudence. 7 Beyond the specific stakes of WTO disputes are the long-term consequences that participation has on future bargaining positions. 8 Through participation with the system, countries are able to voice their opinions on specific aspects of WTO law, contributing to the shaping and interpretation of WTO agreements. When countries systematically fail to participate in the dispute settlement system, as most developing countries have, they risk losing this platform to further individual trade aims within the WTO. The essential point is that members taking part in the dispute settlement system are not solely arguing for or against specific interpretations of WTO law, but are also 'playing for the rules': how the law should be interpreted and with what purpose. In this respect, WTO disputes shape the future bargaining position of members by deciding which trade interests must be protected. 9 This idea is all the more important as the WTO dispute settlement system is still relatively new and thus malleable to the purpose with which its agreements are interpreted. As a form of international law the WTO agreements themselves are 'still largely soft law agreements, with ambiguities and gaps in their provisions'. 10 In clarifying these ambiguities and filling in the legal gaps there is considerable space for members to influence the future direction of trade law. It is for this reason that participation by both developed and developing countries is vital.
Moreover, Mosoti and others propose that participation in the WTO dispute settlement system is not only of value to members for progression of their individual aims, but can be considered a 'public good'. 11 All members benefit from increased participation in the system 6 ibid. 7 ibid. 8 ibid. as the 'litigation creates greater clarity of WTO rules'. 12 Bown and Hoekman also subscribe to this idea as they consider that the dispute settlement system 'improves property rights -in this context market access rights'. 13 Participation in the dispute settlement system therefore adds certainty to otherwise unclear trade agreements. With greater certainty follows more investment and international transactions to the benefit of all trading nations. 14 At the same time, the ability of the dispute settlement system to act as a 'public good' should not be confused with the reality that the dispute settlement system requires a strong element of selfrepresentation. All members have equal opportunity to use the system in furthering their interpretation of trade agreements in so far as they are willing and able to articulate their own interests.
This paper goes on to show that all members are able to use the system so long as governments are willing to invest in doing so. As individuals, private companies or NGOs have no standing to bring violations to the WTO: only governments are able to initiate proceedings.
Bown has been among the supporters of the view that self-representation can create a bias against developing countries. The basis of a self-representation system relies on the concept that 'countries have sufficient resources to both monitor and recognize relevant WTO violations and to fund legal proceedings in cases in which their rights have been violated ' . 15 Yet as evidence shows, not all developing countries can afford to do so. The increased legalistic nature of the dispute settlement system has resulted in a high cost of WTO litigation that developed countries are able to absorb more easily then developing countries, which places developed countries in an advantageous position. The result of this can be seen in the disparities in participation rates among developed and developing countries. Hence it is suggested that the WTO dispute settlement system is institutionally biased, 16 pricing developing countries out of their ability to participate within the system.
However, such criticism of the WTO dispute settlement system misunderstands the conceptual foundations on which it works. The self-representation element of the dispute settlement system is not biased against developing countries, but instead builds a legitimate 12 ibid. judicial system based on the rule of law. The Panel and Appellate Body process within the WTO dispute settlement system focusses on an adversarial model requiring proactive initiation of proceedings and direct engagement. As will be discussed further in this paper, despite perceived access issues this litigation model creates 'a level playing field' for complainants and respondents, as the court of law gives parties equal bargaining positions from which to state their legal arguments. In this manner the WTO dispute settlement system encompasses the notion of 'right before might'. 17 Developing countries therefore have most to gain from such a judicial system where the strength of legal argument rather than leverage is the determining factor for Panel and Appellate Body decisions. Related to this is the inevitability of costs in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system. In any case, as in all judicial systems limitation in time and resources within the WTO dispute settlement system means that the system would risk being over burdened by cases if there were no cost of participation.
Consequently the inherent costs make the system viable: '[i]f there were no implicit "user fees", the dispute settlement system would implode. It has to cost something to keep out nuisance cases of insignificant value'. 18 Hence developing countries must recognise that although the dispute settlement system is costly, these costs must be borne in order to ensure its legitimacy.
Furthermore, the requirement of self-representation and self-initiation of WTO dispute settlement proceedings is in keeping with the fact that the WTO is not a supranational entity but a judicial one. In order for the dispute settlement system to maintain its legitimacy as a member-driven organisation, governments must be the driving force in WTO litigation. A selfrepresentation framework in the dispute settlement system therefore ensures that it is members who determine the direction of WTO law as it is members that bring complaints. Moreover, the self-initiation of proceedings under the WTO means that governments maintain accountability within their countries. When governments are accountable, they must justify to industry and exporters their decision to bring or not bring claims to the WTO. The benefit of this approach is that it drives more proactive decision-making by member governments forcing them to weigh up the costs and benefits in each case. As will be discussed further in a later section, this also motivates members to debate important trade policy issues within their governments and build greater trade capacity. Consequently this paper argues that in weighing up the costs and benefits of participating within the WTO dispute settlement system, developing countries need to give due weight to the wider strategic importance of active 17 Shaffer and Melendiz-Ortiz (n 3) Preface. 18 Hakan Nordström and Gregory Shaffer, 'Access to justice in the World Trade Organization: a case for a small claims procedure?' (2008) 7(4) World Trade Review 587, 587.
participation, and as it will go on to argue, embrace the means within the WTO dispute settlement system to offset inherent costs.
C. THE PROBLEM OF LOW PARTICIPATION BY DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES
Participation in the dispute settlement system is defined broadly evaluating the trends with which the members access and use the system. This discussion therefore looks at the initiation through their use of the system enabling the identification of some of the individual problems facing countries.
D. REASONS FOR LOW PARTICIPATION WITHIN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A COST AND CAPACITY DEBATE
In this paper explanations for low participation among developing countries are broadly distinguished into cost and capacity issues. 32 Here, cost issues describe the price of using the dispute settlement system which can usually be calculated by members in monetary terms.
These costs are factored into the overall cost-benefit analysis members perform when deciding whether to initiate WTO proceedings. In contrast, capacity issues refer largely to internal issues within countries that jeopardise the member's ability to participate fully in the system; they are often individual to each member country. Although the two issues are largely interlinked, the distinction between the two helps to pinpoint where the problem of low participation lies and methods of possible reform. It is true that there are inherent costs in the WTO dispute settlement
system, yet these are, on balance, successfully offset by provisions within the same system.
The trends in developing country participation show that the problem principally lies in members' ability to identify viable legal cases to bring to the WTO. The real problem is not cost, but one of capacity.
Issues of cost
As touched on above, cost issues associated with the dispute settlement system are of predominant concern to developing countries when attempting to participate in the WTO. The increased legalistic nature of the dispute settlement system from its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has been central to the high-cost of WTO litigation.
The approach under the old GATT system worked on the basis of a 'small "club" of likeminded trade policy officials working together'. 33 The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement introduced a Dispute Settlement Body and an Appellate Body, resulting in a new judicial system for international trade disputes. 34 The changes strengthened the legal basis of dispute proceedings and created a more structured litigation model than had previously existed. An inherent consequence of the more legalistic system has become the increased cost of using the WTO dispute settlement system. Due to the greater technical aspects of law that has followed from 32 Browne (n 10 the litigation model, a certain level of expertise is now required in order for countries to participate in proceedings. The cost of hiring experts and trade lawyers in order to manoeuvre within the legal structure has resulted in the increased overall cost of participation.
Similarly, the substantial number of WTO cases each year, contributing to the rising total of 497 cases, 35 has made understanding and digesting the legal intricacies of WTO law costly for members. The reality of the situation is that 'the jurisprudence of the WTO grows with each passing year, making it necessary to read numerous book-length Panel and Appellate
Body decisions in order to properly understand the legal context.' 36 Taking into consideration both the cost of lawyers and increased effort in discerning legal arguments from lengthy WTO decisions, the cost of WTO litigation has been estimated at $500,000. 37 The further risk is that 'with uncertainty, if exporters consistently over-estimated the litigation costs and/or underestimated the increase in profits associated with market access benefits, this would also increase the likelihood that an exporter would choose not to initiate a dispute at the WTO.'
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Bown and Hoekman submit that the suggested figure is likely to be at the lower end of estimates as it includes neither 'the resources necessary to investigate potential claims in the pre-litigation phase, nor the resources necessary to engage public relations and/or political lobbying in the however, has the ability to add to the uncertain costs of WTO litigation for members, causing respondents to be in a worse bargaining position. Browne goes on to suggest that 'such compensation should also be paid if the developed country unilaterally withdraws the measure before completion of proceedings'. 43 Yet if this were the case, it would be likely that developed countries would be further motivated to litigate to the end and less willing to settle at an early stage. This would be to the cost of developing countries. Alternatively, 'a Panel might ask the respondent to suspend the measure in dispute for a specified period'. 44 This is a better method to avoid the loss of trade during WTO disputes as it means that attempts to delay proceedings will not impede a developing country's bargaining position.
More radical reform has been suggested to the legal framework of the WTO dispute settlement system in order to reduce its cost to developing countries. China has proposed reform to the WTO dispute settlement proceedings by shifting the burden of cost to developed countries. In cases where the Appellate Body rules in favour of a developing country it is suggested that the developed country should pay for the developing country's legal costs, thus reducing the developing country's cost of participation. 45 Despite mitigating the litigation costs for developing countries, such an approach would be imbalanced. As discussed above, the costs of WTO dispute settlement system are inherent costs that must be borne by all members to ensure equality under the law. As developing countries benefit from using the system, it is not surprising that they must also bear some of its costs.
Mention should also be made of the proposal that the WTO should put in place a small claims procedure. 46 Nordström and Shaffer's principal argument for this is that the WTO dispute settlement system in its current form 'is not neutral to size'. 47 Small developing countries and LDCs are constrained in their ability to use the dispute settlement system as their low volume of world trade means that the increased market access they would achieve through successful litigation would be little relative to the costs. 48 In addition to the rudimentary issues such as defining 'small' claims, 49 to have such a separate system alongside the WTO dispute settlement system would worsen the problem that such a procedure wishes to address. The idea that the WTO dispute settlement system currently lacks legitimacy due to the fact that developing members are failing to participate will be exacerbated if small developing countries instead use a small claims procedure. 50 The principal criticism is 'that a remedy of monetary compensation could create an incentive for developed countries to buy themselves out of their WTO obligations through the payment of compensation, rather than complying with them, thereby undoing agreed trade concessions'. 51 The proposal is therefore based on the assumption that financial concerns are the decisive factor for developing countries. However, as previously noted, specific financial outcome is not the only reason for participation in the dispute settlement system: of equal importance are the wider issues of terms of trade and bargaining positions. Consequent to the adoption of a small claims procedure, the WTO dispute settlement system would become 'a rich man's tool of economic subjugation'. 52 As small developing countries would avoid using the dispute settlement system, they would no longer be part of the process of shaping of trade law or 'playing for the rules'. Thus, money spent creating a small claims procedure would be better used for making improvements to the single WTO dispute settlement system. Despite the cumbersome cost of litigation, developing countries have methods available to them to offset this within the WTO. The most successful of these has been the ACWL.
Although independent from the WTO, the ACWL works as part of the wider support network available to developing country members to reduce costs. The organisation takes a two -tier approach to support; providing legal services at reduced fees for developing countries and providing sufficient training on WTO law, the latter of which will be discussed later in this paper. Even though the ACWL is jointly funded by its 11 developed and 32 developing country members, it is the developed countries that provide most of the funding to the ACWL Endowment Fund and Working Capital Fund. 59 The ACWL follows WTO principles in providing LDCs with preferential treatment as LDCs do not need to contribute to the budget and are not required to become members of the ACWL before being able to use its services.
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The ACWL also provides free legal advice on procedural and substantive issues of WTO law for all members up to a certain number of hours. 61 Developing countries are banded into three categories based on their world trade and per capital income (LDCs constituting a fourth band).
These bands reflect the hourly rate charged for ACWL support in WTO proceedings applying levels of discount progressively. 62 The extent of the ACWL's benefits is shown by the fact that legal fees are likely to be discounted by as much as 90 percent for LDCs.
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As well as providing its own legal services at a reduced fee, the ACWL creates a network of private international law firms who also agree to provide external counsel for a reduced price. 64 By doing so, the ACWL provides expert legal advice to developing countries at a fraction of the cost of private law firms. As legal fees are a large proportion of the overall costs of WTO litigation, 'the ACWL lowers the overall costs of the self-enforcement process'. 65 The consequence of this on developing country participation is that 'the ACWL Alternatively, a more strategic use of the WTO dispute settlement system by developing countries can mean that they avoid the high costs of litigation whilst gaining the experience needed. As discussed above, participation in the dispute settlement system is not confined to Nonetheless, what it is more telling about developing countries' attitudes towards the WTO dispute settlement system is the fact that these alternative dispute resolution methods are 75 Bown and Hoekman (n 13) 874. 76 Therefore, when active participation in the WTO dispute settlement system has the potential to create enemies, it is sensible for some countries to want to avoid the limelight of litigation.
In addition, developing countries may fear retaliation beyond the WTO. By initiating WTO proceedings against developed countries, developing countries risk losing prior privileges, aid and investment on which they have become reliant. This poses a particular concern for those LDCs who are the greatest receivers of aid. Factoring this into the dispute settlement proceedings shows a skewed balance of power between developed and developing countries going into the process. A resistance from developing countries may therefore be a case of not wanting to 'bite the hand that feeds it'. As the WTO does not contain any overt code of conduct against such practices and has few safeguards to protect countries from such behaviour, there is a lacuna in the law. The WTO does acknowledge these fears in part in its 'special and differential provisions' for developing countries discussed above, but it does not through adjustments to the disputed variable'. 105 Consultation is more likely to create a winwin situation that preserves the political sensitivity of trade relations.
Furthermore, in developing countries where there is a culture of non-litigation, such as Thailand and China, the consultation stage provides an amicable setting to resolve disputes.
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Consultations give members 60 days in which to reach a 'mutually satisfactory solution'.
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Within this is also the provision of Article 4(10) DSU that 'during consultations Members should give special attention to the particular problems and interests of developing country Members'. 108 Although this provision 'is more declaratory than operative', 109 it does follow the general principle within the dispute settlement system of preferential treatment to developing and LDC members.
Busch and Reinhardt argue that the success of the consultations and the WTO dispute settlement system in general is because members are bargaining in the shadow of the law. Even though the dispute settlement system has been criticised for a lack of enforceability of Panel and Appellate Body decisions, this does not hinder the process. 110 Instead members bargain in the shadow of the law:
A panel ruling carries weight to the extent that it delivers a timely and coherent normative statement on the matter. Even without a credible threat by a complainant to seek authorization to retaliate, a definitive legal opinion from the institution may empower groups in the defendant state who oppose the measure.
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Thus, developing countries have stronger bargaining positions within the dispute settlement system than they would if they attempted to bargain outside of the WTO. Busch and Reinhardt therefore argue that 'the central problem for developing countries is that they are missing out on early settlement, not that they boast a worse record in winning pro-plaintiff rulings'. 112 Consequently, their solution is that developing countries should receive more assistance before litigation commences. 113 Although this argument coincides with the idea that the model of litigation is not the essence of the issue, this paper goes further to suggest that the problem lies even before the consultation stage. The problem is one of capacity issues in investigating and monitoring potential trade violations.
Issues of capacity
The section above shows that while the inherent cost of the WTO dispute settlement system is a determining factor for developing country participation, it is not the core of the problem. The fact that the WTO system contains numerous ways in which developing countries can reduce the cost of participation establishes that the problem lies more with developing countries' capacity to initiate proceedings. Browne takes us to the heart of the matter, that 'there seems to be little in the WTO system per se that needs correcting in this context. It is rather problems of internal governance and organization in many capitals that may be responsible for the relative absence of many members from the WTO dispute scene'. 114 Linked to participation in the dispute settlement system is the requirement of members to have the internal capacity to bring trade violations to the WTO. Although these capacity issues are individual to countries, by comparing the internal capacity of active developing countries with the capacity of those developing countries that have low participation rates, areas for reform can be identified.
The internal capacity needed within members in order to successfully initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings can be seen as a tripartite connection between trade experts, government and the private sector. 115 Larger developing countries such as Brazil, Argentina and China have in recent years built on these three pillars to create strong internal capacity.
Developing countries that fail to participate fully in the WTO dispute settlement system are likely to do so because one or all of these components are weak within the country. What is meant by full participation is the ability of member governments to identify trade violations and undertake an accurate cost-benefit analysis to bring viable cases to the WTO.
In order to successfully bring claims to the WTO dispute settlement system, developing countries must begin with building internal trade expertise. The primary way to gain internal trade expertise is through maintaining home-grown talent. To begin with, incorporating trade and trade-related issues into the education system will create a pool of trade experts from which the country will benefit. 116 For example, the introduction of higher education courses in trade at universities will encourage a new generation of students and lawyers interested in specialising within this area. 
E. DRIVING INTERNAL CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The sections above have shown that the core of the problem of developing countries' participation lies with identifying WTO violations and the ability of government to accurately assess the viability of bringing these cases into the dispute settlement system. From the evidence, this can be narrowed further into an internal capacity problem within developing countries regarding a lack of convergence between the private sector and government. In this way, as the problem is mostly internal within countries, much of the reform must also be initiated internally. developing countries, the establishment of strong trade associations has increased the monitoring of trade and reduced the overall cost of monitoring for individual companies by encouraging a sharing of industry trends and resources. 145 More importantly, the result of trade associations is a greater political voice with which industries can approach government. It is not surprising that those sectors with powerful lobbies (such as clothing and agriculture) are most successful in approaching government with their concerns. 146 Both the private sector and government benefit from industries having a strong political voice. The private sector creates accountability within government, providing a check on trade policy to ensure that governments are not idle. In addition to this government benefits from the fact that the private sector takes on the costs of investigating and evidence finding for potential WTO cases. It is also argued that the private sector is best placed to absorb these costs as loss of market access hurts their financial interests.
Superficially there is reason to think that an independent prosecutor in the WTO may be a positive reform. However, looking into the viability of the approach shows that it is fraught with obstacles. The suggestion that the WTO dispute settlement system should have an independent prosecutor is based on the idea that this prosecutor would be better able to undertake the investigation and fact-finding role that developing countries are weak in performing. This would mean that developing countries with little internal capacity to support investigations would be able to bring cases to the WTO dispute settlement system. Yet looking broadly at other international organisations that have used this approach shows that there are many problems in having an independent prosecutor. A clear example is the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which is headed by an independent prosecutor from member states on a rotating basis. The ICC in recent years can be seen to be struggling with the lack of resources and political will to manage its growing caseloads. Moreover, the role of prosecutor has become highly political, hindering the prosecutor's ability to bring the accused to court. For this reason the WTO is better off remaining a self-representative system that is member-driven and adheres to a rule of law. 
F. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to undertake a comprehensive discussion of the reasons for the low level of developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system. It is argued here that the approach that developing countries should take to the question of participation is ultimately a cost-benefit analysis. The first section of the paper shows that in considering the benefits to participation, developing countries are aware of the economic stakes, but largely underestimate the wider strategic importance of participation. Moreover, in identifying the reasons why developing countries fail to participate, although the cost issues of the dispute settlement system are frequently acknowledged as the primary obstacle for developing countries, these costs are overstated. The trends in actual participation show that developing countries can use the system in shrewd ways that reduce the inherent costs of the WTO litigation procedure.
What is most important is that developing countries must be more willing to capitalise on the support available within the WTO and outside of it in order to offset cost and capacity issues.
Therefore the question posed in this paper is not of whether developing countries can afford to participate, but whether they have the capacity to do so. In answer to this latter question, it is found that smaller developing countries do not. Developing countries and LDCs are able to litigate within the WTO dispute settlement system, but at the outset lack the ability to make accurate decisions as to the viability of bringing trade violations to the WTO. As this decision is reliant on technical knowledge and legal expertise, a common weakness among small developing countries is with the engagement of the private sector with government. As this capacity issue is distinctly internal, external organisation such as the WTO and ACWL are limited in the support they can provide. More so, the WTO cannot be expected to do much more than it already does. Instead, increased governmental awareness of trade rights in the private sector would provide a more organic solution.
